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I. THE PROBLEM
The experiments here reported constitute a part of a more
extensive study of memory and perception, which will prob-
ably be made public in the future. The work was done in
the laboratory of Professor Kiilpe at Munich. The part
now published cannot, however, be properly evaluated with-
out some indication of the nature of the results obtained in
the first section of the more extensive study. This first part
consisted in an introspective investigation of the mental
processes involved in perception and recall.
The material for experiment in the unpublished section
consisted of spoken words, printed words, printed pictures
and real objects. A series of eight words, pictures or objects
were presented to the subjects. Their task was to repeat
what they had seen or heard and then to give an introspective
account of the mental processes they had experienced during
the perception of the series and during their attempts to
reproduce the same from memory.1 The subjects were asked
particularly to give an account of the temporal sequence of
events as they had experienced them.
It was rather remarkable that in perceiving, the first
thing in consciousness was reported as meaning the second
some kind of imagery. Whereas in repeating the first thing
was often an image whose meaning was understood and then
designated by a word.
A few introspections will bring out more clearly what is
meant by this assertion.
1
 A fuller description of the details of the^technique will be given when the entire
work is made public.
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PERCEPTION OF PRINTED WORDS
" I notice now a certain regularity in this process. With
the first word, the meaning appeared with the reading, with-
out any clear visual image of the object thereby designated.
The same process takes place on the continuation of the
series of words. Gradually it goes on so rapidly that during
the period of exposition (2 seconds) there is time to apprehend
a goodly number of apperceptive complexes, which become
associated with the imaged object. The steps in the process
—so far as I can notice them—are:
" 1 . Apprehension of the meaning.
" 2. Imagery of the object—generally by means of memory
images.
" 3 . Associations which are connected with the object."
Subject Lehner, Nov. 17.1
PERCEPTION OF PICTURES
" I look at the picture and generally have its meaning at
once. Often I am not entirely certain, e. g., spoon or trowel.
When I have the meaning, its naming follows immediately."
—Gruninger, Dec. 17.2
"In the perception of the several pictures, I notice that I
experienced auditory-motor words in immediate connection
with them, and that these words followed with varying
rapidity the individual pictures. It lasted some time till I
got the word 'Mitre.' In this experience it appeared to me
that the rapidity with which the word comes, does not depend
as much upon the finding of the words as it does upon the
1
 Ich merke jetzt eine gewisse Gesetzmassigkeit des Prozesses. Bei dem ersten
Wort tritt roit dem Lesen die Bedeutung bewusst auf, ohne deutliches Gesichtsbild
des darin fizierten Objektes. Derselbe Vorgang vollzieht sich bei der Fortsetzung der
Reihe, allmahlich mit so grosser Scbnelligkeit dass wahrend der Exponierungszeit
noch Zeit bleibt eine ganze Fulle von Apperceptionsmassen bewusst zu erfassen, die
sich an das vorgestellte Objekt noch kniipfen. Die Stufen so weit ich sie bemerken
kann sind: I. Erfassung der Bedeutung. 2. Vorstellung des Objektes, gewohnlich
durch Erinnerungsbilder. 3. Associationen die sich an das Objekt kniipfen. (i7ten.
Nov.)
2
 Ich sehe das Bild and und meistens habe ich sofort die Bedeutung. Manchmal
bin ich nicht ganz sicher z. B. Loffel oder Kelle. Wenn ich die Bedeutung habe, folgt
sofort die Benennung.
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recognition of the picture. It is on this account that I would
willingly have looked longer at the pictures. The words
served as designations for the pictures or if you will the
objects represented by the pictures, and had another sense, a
more general meaning than their relation to the individual
pictures or their objects."—Subject Kiilpe, Nov. 14.1
REPETITION OF OBJECTS
"On repeating, there comes to me all of a sudden a visual
image. When this image comes promptly it is usually
complete. But when I must think awhile, there comes to me
first of all something striking in the object. Then come
further qualities, e. g., to the color the form. As soon as this
process of supplementing has developed to a certain point,
the meaning is all of a sudden present. As soon as I have
the meaning, the object seems to become still clearer. E. g.:
All of a sudden I see the typical lustre of a pearl. Then
there comes to me the round form and then all at once I
know what it is."—Subject Griininger, Dec. io.2
Were meaning in some manner identical with imagery,
or were it produced by imagery or the imaginal context of a
sensation as Titchener suggests is often the case, we should
expect just such introspections as this from our subjects—•
not however for memory but for perception. That they are
1
 Ich bemerke dass ich bei der Wahrnehmung dereinzelnen Bilder sofort akustisch-
motorische Worter in Anschluss an sie erlebt habe, und dass diese Worter in verschie-
dener Geschwindigkeit sich an die einzelnen Bilder anschlossen. Bei dem Wort Bischofs-
mutze, z. B., dauerte es ziemlich lang bis ich es fang. Dabei schien die Geschwindig-
keit des Auftretens der Worter nicht sowohl in der Wortfindung selbst als vielmehr in der
Erkennung des Bildes begrundet zu sein. Damit hangt es zusammen dass ich einige
Bilder gerne langer betrachtet hatte. Die Worter galten als die Bezeichnungen fur
die Bilder bzw. die Gegenstande die in ihnen dargestellt waren, und hatten einen an-
deren Sinn, eine allgemeinere Bedeutung als die Beziehung auf die einzelnen Bilder oder
ihre Gegenstande. (i4ten Nov.)
1
 Beim Hereagen taucht einfach ganz plotzlich ein optisches Bild auf. Wenn das
Bild schnell auftritt, dann ist es meistens vollstandig. Wenn ich einige Zeit suchen
muss, dann taucht zuerst etwas besonders auffalliges am Gegenstand auf. Dann
koramen weitere Qualitaten, z. B. zur Farbe die Form, und sobald diese Erganzung
einen grosseren Grad erreicht hat ist die Bedeutung auf einmal da, und sobald ich die
Bedeutung habe, scheint mir der Gegenstand noch deutlicher zu werden. Z. B. Ich
sehe auf einmal den eigenartigen Glanz der " Perle." Dann kommt mir die runde Form,
und dann auf einmal weiss ich was es ist. (loten Dez.)
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found in memory and not in perception is strong evidence
against any such theory. Here the nature of the occurrence
points to the fact that an image as such means nothing just
as Professor Titchener himself claims. It must be inter-
preted. It can be interpreted only when sufficient data is
present. When this is the case, the subject knows what it is.
This knowledge of what the image represents is not reported
as a sensory element added to the elaboration of the image.
A new image would itself have to be recognized. The
interpretation of the image is a knowing. It is something
which follows the awareness of the image just as understand-
ing follows the sensations involved in perception.
REPETITION OF PICTURES
"The repetition took place in this manner: First I thought
of the first member of the series. Then without holding more
strictly to the order of perception each word was spoken
following an imaginal representation of the pictures. When
I stopped, I attempted to bring up to myself the series. Only
by the rising up of a visual image did I obtain a new word."
—Subject Kiilpe, Nov. 14.1
Such introspections as these suggested a further investiga-
tion. The subjects had noticed a certain sequence of events in
the process of perception. Would it be possible to react to
the events that had been noted? If meaning comes before
imagery in the perception of printed words, would it be
possible for the subject to react, now to imagery and now to
meaning? And if so, what would be the quantitative results?
In the experiments here reported this problem was at-
tempted, to investigate, namely, by means of reaction time
the temporal relations of meaning and imagery in the per-
ception of printed words and pictures. The experiments
were made in the psychological laboratory of Professor
1
 Das Hersagen geshah so dass ich mich zunachst auf das erste Glied der Reihe
zuruckbesann. Danach wurden die einzelnen Worter im Anschluss an die anschau-
lichen Vorstellungen der Bilder ohne die Ordnung der Wahraehmung strenger einzu-
halten ganannt. Wenn ich stockte, suchte ich mir die Reihe wiederzuvergegen-
wartigen und bekam erst durch eine neue Auftauchung des Vorstellungsbildes ein neues
Wort (Nov. 14th).
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Kiilpe in Munich during the winter semester of 1913—14
and the summer semester of 1914. The author wishes to
take this opportunity to thank Professor Kulpe for his great
kindness, for his interest and suggestions, and for the sacrifice
of his time as subject.
II. METHOD OF RESEARCH
The words and pictures used in these experiments desig-
nated simple familiar objects—all capable of being visualized;
e. g., tree, lamp, knife. Abstract words, prepositions, etc.,
were not used, in order that conditions might be as favorable
as possible for the development of imagery. Had such words
been used the difference that was found in reaction time for
meaning and imagery would have been much greater. The
use of such words would indeed have been justified. For if
sensations and images must explain all meanings they must
be involved, and exclusively involved, not merely in the
perception of things that can be immediately sensed, but also
in more abstract mental content. In order, however, to test
the theory on the ground where it is best able to stand, it
was concluded to forego the use of any words except those
that represented familiar sensory objects.
The accompanying plates give an insight into the material
used in these experiments. Most of them represent objects
that can be named by a one or two syllable German word.
The words used were printed on cards in a large legible type.
The use of control words and drawings enabled one to be
sure that the subjects were actually reacting to meanings.
The controls used in the series of words were nonsense
combinations of letters forming one or two syllables. The
controls used in the series of pictures were meaningless
drawings. In general, the subject was instructed to react
(by releasing a telegraph key) in case the word or the drawing
represented some real object. The words were exposed by a
combination memory and tachistoscope apparatus. The re-
action times were measured by a Hipp chronoscope. This
was controlled by a pendulum constructed in accordance with
a design by Professor Kiilpe. The variable error in the
T. F. MOORE
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chronoscope was negligible—averaging less than 3 <r. The
constant error was about 70 a. Nine subjects took part in
the experiments. A preparatory signal (l->£ sec.) was given
verbally with the aid of a stop watch.
III. SIMPLE1 MEANING AND VISUAL IMAGERY
(a) Quantitative Results
The instructions to the subject in this experiment will
indicate the precise nature of the problem. They are repro-
duced without translation. The subject read them over at
the beginning of each period. A few trial periods were
necessary for some subjects in order that they might learn
not to react to the control word. These preparatory series
were not included in the final results. One of our subjects
(Gl.) never did get free from erroneous reactions and his
results show a marked difference from the others.
Sie werden nach einem Signal ein Wort zu sehen (bzw.zu
horen) bekommen. Ich bitte Sie zu reagieren wenn Sie das
Wort verstanden oder seine Bedeutung erfasst, bzw. wenn
Sie eine Gesichtsvorstellung von dem durch das Wort bezeich-
neten Gegenstand gehabt haben.
Die Worte 'Bedeutung' und 'Vorstellung' werden Ihnen
angeben ob das eine oder das andere verlangt wird. Nachher
bitte ich mir kurz das Erlebnis zu charakterisieren, and dabei
anzugeben, ob die aufgetauchte Vorstellung an die Stelle
der Bedeutung gesetzt werden konnte, etwa bloss die konkrete
anschauliche Erfiillung dessen war, was in der Bedeutung
abstrakt intendiert wurde.
In this series, therefore, the subject reacted either (a) To
the awareness that the word had a meaning, or (b) To the
awareness of the visual image of the object.
If there is no difference between meaning and the visual
image of an object represented by a word the average of the
two series should be approximately the same. The subject
ought not to be able to distinguish meaning and imagery
1
 By 'simple meaning' is not meant an absolute simplicity. The word is used to
contrast this set of experiments with a later one where the more complex consciousness
of purpose was required.
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and this should manifest itself in averages for the two sets of
reactions that approached each other within the limits of
experimental error. If meaning, however, is produced by
or is identical with the visual image which accrues to the
sensations involved in the perception of the word, the image
series should be shorter if anything than the meaning series.
The results are given below. The tables are clear without































































































































































































Reactions to visual imagery equal to or below median =0 .
















































































































































































































































































Reaction to visual imagery equal or below median=l.





















































































































































































































































































































Reactions to visual imagery equal or before median=0.












































































































































































































Reactions to visual imagery equal or below median=0.
reaction times in thousandths of a second. Under F, the
variations from the mean.
At the bottom of each column the mean reaction times
and mean variations have been calculated. The median for
the reaction times to meaning have also been determined.
With but one exception, our nine subjects show a marked
difference in their reactions to meaning and imagery. The










































































































































































































































































Reactions to visual imagery equal or below median=0.
one exception is not to be explained by individual difference
in mental type, but rather by an anxiety to react as quickly
as possible. At first he reacted to every nonsense word.
He was then tried with pictures. Here again, every meaning-
less drawing elicited a reaction in spite of instructions. The
reaction times at first varied around 100 a. Later he was
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asked to wait each time and make a judgment that he had
fulfilled the task given him. Even under these instructions,
he continued to react occasionally to nonsense words—the
following reaction being very much retarded. He finally
gave up the experiments. What would have resulted had he
by practice become entirely free from erroneous reactions
one cannot say. It would seem, however, more fair to a just
conclusion to exclude rather than include his results in our
summary. Leaving aside the results of this subject, the
reaction times to visual imagery were all but one above the
median of the reaction time to meaning. It is worthy of note
that this single exception is the first recorded reaction of this
subject. (He had made several practice series before.) Our



























































































of chance that reaction times to imagery should be longer than
those to meaning we could find about 75 longer and 75 shorter.
As a matter of fact, we find 149 longer and only one shorter.
In spite then of the rather small number of reactions (condi-
tioned by taking the introspective reports) there is over-
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whelming evidence to show that something more than chance
has to do with the difference in reaction time to meaning and
imagery. This difference is not due to the words used for
imagery and meaning. Not only were the words in both
cases representative of sensory objects but care was taken to
repeat the same words in the two series. A table is given
above comparing the reactions of one subject for meaning
and imagery to the same words. Under D is given the
difference between the two. The reaction time to imagery is
always longer than to meaning. With some of our subjects
the results are not so unanimous, the meaning reaction being
occasionally longer. This is to be explained mainly by the
effects of practice, though something is no doubt due to
accidental variation.
(b) INTROSPECTIVE DATA
From the quantitative results that have just been given,
it is evident that the subjects give a different response when
told to react to meaning or imagery. Were we to stop with
the quantitative results we would not know very much about
the nature of that difference. Is meaning simply an early
stage in the development of the image? Is it a vague con-
fused image? Is it merely the realization of the power to
visualize the object? Is it the tendency of a number of
images to crowd into consciousness? What is the difference?
There can be no doubt that a considerable difference exists
and it is of great importance to find out precisely what it
is. This can be done by an examination of the subjects'
introspective reports of what they experienced during their
reactions. The reports were taken down by dictation imme-
diately after the reaction and then re-read to the subject to
insure their accuracy. The originals are in German and
will be given in German and in English when a complete
account of all the experiments is published.
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CONSCIOUSNESS OF MEANING
(1) The meaning has a general character.
Kerze:" There came to me at once the
word 'Light.' This was not a determina-
tion of the meaning, but only another
word for it. The meaning was entirely
general, as if I should say a candle, that
is, any candle—every possible candle."
—Kfllpe, 9/II.
(2) The universality of the meaning is
not always absolute.
Ring: "As soon as I saw this word, I
experienced an auditory motor stimulus,
and immediately in connection therewith
the understanding of that which the word
signified. This was quite universal with-
out being related to anything in partic-
ular—except the limitation to 'finger-
ring.' I am distinctly conscious that a
finger-ring was intended. I cannot re-
member an image of any such ring."
—Kulpe, 13III.
(3) The meaning is at times fell to be in-
complete, because of an unanalyzed con-
sciousness of what the word signifies.
Schere: "At first, a feeling of familiar-
ity was present and then a feeling of cer-
tainty that I know what the word sig-
nifies without having analyzed its mean-
ing any further. First, during the reac-
tion itself there came the further thought
'something with which one cuts.'"
—Moore, 9/VI.
Eule: " I knew that the word was some-
thing with which I am familiar and knew
that from this point I could, at any time,
go on and find its more specific meaning.
Thereupon I reacted. In the word itself
there was something presented to con-
sciousness (mir gegeben) that I cannot
further describe."—Frl. Marezoll, 10/VI.
CONSCIOUSNESS OF VISUAL IMAGERY
(1) The image is particular.
Sofa: " I have a rather good image and
I did not pronounce the word. I see with
great precision the brown color and the
form of the object—but not of the entire
object. I could derive several concepts
from this one image. It looks like a large
reclining chair. The image would not do
for all sofas."—Griininger, 16/II.
(2) The image is at times schematic.
Herz: " I read the word 'heart' and
apprehended its meaning. I remembered
my task and sought after an image. I
projected over the place of the card a
heart of regular mathematical propor-
tions. Only the contours were imaged,
and these by such an airy line that I
question myself whether I had a visual
image at all or whether it was an ideal
construction, such as one carries out
in mathematical thinking."—Scherren,
13/VH.
(3) The image is at times incomplete in
a different way.
(i) It is partial.
Rechen: "First, the meaning, then the
image. Nevertheless, I reacted before the
image was clear. I imaged a part of a
rake. Already I have noted several
times that I image the left lower parts of
objects. Here I imaged a wooden rake."
—Stappen, 17/II.
(ii) /* represents a single definite char-
acter of an object.
Kuh: " I have the meaning and now I
must have an image. I then look at an
empty spot—no longer at the word.
Then there appears the color of the ani-
mal. I see'brown.' But a satisfactory,
complete image, I do not obtain. I must
exert myself even to obtain the color. I
could not take the image for the meaning.
I cannot read anything more out of the
image than 'brown'—never the meaning
'cow.'"—Gruninger, 16/II.
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CONSCIOUSNESS OF MEANING
(4) The meaning never has sensory
characteristics but rather a conceptual de-
termination.
Geier: "A moment passed before I
found the meaning. No auditory-kinaes-
thetic image was present. I knew that it
was something that hovers over moun-
tains in the air—even though I did not
see the mountains. Visually I imaged
only a pair of extended wings and knew
that something belonged between them."
—Frl. Marezoll, 14/V.
Veilchen: Immediately after the word
appeared, I had an auditory-kinresthetic
image of it—as I pronounce it. 'Veil-
chen,' and in connection therewith a
knowledge of its meaning (Ein allge-
meines Bedeutungswissen), that I can
thus explain: a definite species of flower.
I dare say that it is this which makes up
the content of the meaning—what I actu-
ally know about this object during the ex-
periment.—Kulpe, 18/V.
(5) The meaning is often expressed in
terms of a definition of general applica-
tion.
Dampfschiff: Immediately on the expo-
sition of the word, auditory-kinsesthetic
image thereof, and a realization of the
meaning in the sense of' a means of trans-
port by water.' This time there was no
trace of any image.—Kulpe, 16/II.
(6) The meaning is never localized.
CONSCIOUSNESS OK VISUAL IMAGES?
(4) The image manifests degrees of
brightness, color and clearness.
Rose: "Immediately after the word
came I had the auditory-kinaesthetic
image of the word and thereupon an
understanding for its general significa-
tion. Then first came an image—the
image of a blossom. Almost nothing of
the stem was seen. Colorless, mere dif-
ferences of brightness in the blossom
and the leaves were perceived* A full
blown rose. The common form. Image
and meaning did not cover each other."
—Kulpe, 16/II.
Krug: Meaning then the visual image.
It was an earthenware jug, bellied out in
front—antique as if it had just been dug
up.—Lehner, 7/VII.
(5) The image is often described in sen-
sory terms that would fit only a very definite
object.
Rettich: This time there came to me the
image of a radish of medium size. I saw
clearly the little hollows in its skin filled
with dirt and myself in the attitude in
which I cultivate this beautiful variety in
my wife's garden. All at once there
came to me a poem of Morike. It 16 en-
titled 'The Radish.'—Lehner, 16/II.
(6) The image has often a definite
position.
Schuh: I had an indistinct image of a
laced shoe—the point to the right some-
what behind the plane of the word. A
confused consciousness of meaning was
also immediately present, which did not
coincide with the image. The meaning
was even more general than foot covering.
It had somewhat the sense of a piece of
clothing without relation to a part of the
body.—Kulpe, 23/II.
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(8) The meaning is never looked upon as
superfluous.
CONSCIOUSNESS OF MEANING CONSCIOUSNESS OF VISUAL IMAGERY
(7) The meaning is always pertinent to (7) The image is sometimes recognized
the word. as not strictly pertaining to the word.
Rettich: The word appeared very
strange to me. I think I read something
like 'Bettish.' Only later did I get the
correct meaning. There came a visual
image. The image did not really repre-
sent a radish but rather a kind of turnip.
(8) The image is often regarded as un-
necessary and of secondary importance.
Ochs: I first understood the word as
something familiar, as something that I
knew what it was. A further analysis of
the meaning did not take place. Under
the influence of the task, my attention
was directed to experiencing an image and
then arose the head of an ox with his
horns as drawn in the pictures for these
experiments.—Moore, I2/VI.
Fass: Immediately after looking at the
word an auditory-kinaesthetic representa-
tion and understanding of its general sig-
nification in the sense of a spatial meas-
ure. There came also—altogether fleet-
ingly a weak image with a pair of hoops
lying on the ground—wholly accessory as
if a schema.—Kulpe, 16/II.
(9) The image is often lacking.
Such cases could be multiplied indefi-
nitely. Some have already been given.
(10) The image is only occasionally
present before the meaning.
Kuh: I believe1 the image came first—
wholly undefined. Very soon thereafter
the meaning, immediately after which the
reaction.—Stappen, 17/IL
The image must often be sought.
Flasche: I had the feeling of a consider-
ably retarded flow of imagery, and per-
ceived clearly that I was sharply concen-
strated upon my task. I then imagined
that I went through Amalien Street and
1
 These cases are very rare. I have found them only with this subject and when
he does mention them, it is always with reserve. He says ' I believe' indicating that he
is not sure of the observation.
(9) The meaning is always present.
(10) The meaning leads regularly to the
image.
Nearly always the subjects report the
meaning as coming first.
(11) The meaning comes spontaneously.
Cases enough have already been cited
to make this evident. Only occasionally,
where the word is read incorrectly, is any
effort required to bring out this meaning.
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CONSCIOUSNESS OF MEANING CONSCIOUSNESS OF VISUAL IMAGERY
had the task to represent to myself a
bottle. The representation succeeded
but rather poorly. Only the image of
the material (glass) and the long form
was clear.—Lehner, 3/VII.
A careful consideration of these results will show that
the difference between meaning and visual imagery does not
consist in any possible difference in the original imagery itself.
If meaning were an early stage in the development of the
visual imagery, it might be possible to explain in this way
the difference in the reaction times to the two events. A
candid consideration of the introspections shows that this is
not the case. The universality of the meaning cannot be
pictured and is something quite different from the schematism
of the image. The incompleteness of the image with a
fragmentary character and washed out coloring differs pro-
foundly from the imperfect unanalyzed embryonic stage of
the meaning. The image has sensory characters which
cannot be ascribed to the meaning—the meaning cognative
characters which are utterly foreign to the image. The
meaning is a 'knowing' sui generis; the image is a sensational
element with its own specific character.
The meaning is not the potentiality to visualize. It may
have an element of potentiality about it, but it always has
an element of actuality which extends from the unanalyzed
knowledge expressed by the phrase: " I know what that is"
—to the more perfect conception expressed by a definition.
The potentiality of the meaning when present is not the
same for all meanings. It is a definite potentiality in which
the elements of a definition of the object are in subconscious-
ness. It is not the potentiality to visualize, for the poten-
tiality to visualize (1) depends on a meaning to determine
what is to be visualized; (2) results in something different
from the actualization of the meaning. The actualization of
the meaning leads to the consciousness of a definition which
may not even be accompanied by imagery of any kind
whatever.
Nor is imagery the tendency of a number of images to
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crowd into consciousness. That tendency is sometimes pre-,
sent especially with one of our subjects, but by him it was
recognized as something that came after the meaning.1
Meaning is often present and one is definitely conscious
of it without being conscious of a tendency of images to crowd
into consciousness. Meaning is a consciousness of knowledge
that has definite characters foreign to the images that tend
to crowd into consciousness. Furthermore, where images do
crowd into consciousness they have to be known. This
knowledge of what the image represents cannot be explained
by another image which would itself have to be known.
Meaning, therefore, appears to be a conscious process
sui generis distinct from imagery.
IV. CONSCIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE AND KIN^STHETIC
IMAGERY
(a) Quantitative Results
The instructions to the subject indicate sufficiently the
nature of the investigation in this section of the work. These
instructions were as follows:
Sie werden nach einem Signal ein Wort zu sehen bekom-
men. Ich bitte Sie zu reagieren wenn Sie die Bedeutung des
Wortes im Hinblick auf den Gebrauch oder die Funktion des
damit bezeichneten Gegenstandes erfasst, bzw., wenn Sie
eine kinaesthetische oder kinaesthetisch-optische Vorstellung
davon gehabt haben.
The words chosen for reaction stimuli in this set were not
merely capable of being visualized but represented objects
that most of us have often handled as: brush, bell, hat. To
represent a word like 'lion' by a kinaesthetic image is to some
subjects a very difficult task. Consequently a more appro-
priate set of words was chosen. Even under the most favor-
able conditions the kinaesthetic image comes far too late to
account for the meaning. It might, however, be claimed
that such an image is identical with the consciousness of the
purpose of an object. Accordingly the comparison was made
between reactions to the consciousness of purpose and those
1
 Cf. supra, p. 178. Subject Lehner.
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to the awareness of a kinaesthetic image which concerned
the object itself. Mere verbal images were excluded. Seven
subjects took part in this set of experiments.











































































































































































Number of times median for concept exceeds reaction time for imagery = I.
With all of our subjects the mean for reaction time to
kinsesthetic imagery is longer than that to the concept of
purpose. Examining these results critically we find that
with some of our subjects in spite of the small number of



























































































































































































































































Number of times median for concept exceeds reaction time for imagery=0.

































































































































































































Number of times median for concept exceeds reaction time for imagery=3.
experiments we can say definitely that the concept of purpose
comes quicker than the kinsesthetic imagery. With these
subjects the median for the concept of purpose was shorter
than everyone of the reaction times to kinaesthetic imagery.
With one subject, one out of eight reactions to kinaesthetic
imagery was shorter than the median; with another two out of







































































































































































































Number of times median for concept exceeds reaction time for imagery=2.
twenty-eight. With one of our subjects the matter looks a
little doubtful; six out of sixteen are shorter than the median.
With another subject1 the results are too few and scattered
to give any quantitative basis for judgment.
The question is one where individual differences are likely
to play a part. Those who readily form kinsesthetic imagery
may be able to obtain such an image more quickly than they
can think of the purpose of the object. To what extent this
is true cannot be decided from the present results.2
1
 It was impossible to get more experiments from this subject. He left the day
after the series above reported and did aot return in the summer semester. They
are more of the nature of a preparatory series than final results.
2
 When a short abstract from this paper was read last December at the meeting
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Taking all the results together only 12 out of 105 reactions
to kinaesthetic imagery were shorter than the median of the
various subjects' reaction-times to the concept of purpose.
(b) Introspective Data
Turning now to the introspective results, we find that
the concept of purpose and the kinaesthetic image are very
clearly differentiated. The concept of purpose differs from
the simple meaning in that it does not come with the same
necessity. It is the result of the subject's task—not of the
mere exposition of the stimulus. The same is true of the
kinaesthetic image. Both follow upon the awareness of the
simple meaning. Neither is a necessary prelude nor a se-
quence of the other. The task "image" or "concept" is the
main factor in determining which is to appear.
The following are some of the more noteworthy intro-
spective differences between the two.
(1) The concept of purpose is expressed (i) The kinasthetic image always de-
in non-sensory conceptual terms. scribes some kind of act involving a use of
the muscles.
Zwicker: "I imaged my own eye glasses Sichel: "Immediately after the word
and had clearly a consciousness of con- appeared I had an auditory-kinsesthetic
cave glasses. I was further conscious of image of it. Following this I constructed
the fact that these glasses must refract a visual and weak kinxsthetic image
the rays of light according to a definite thereof in this manner. I held a sickle in
law that the image may still fall upon the my right hand and made movements
retina—even though the lens is incapable therewith as if I were cutting grass,
of doing it this service. I then formu- Thereupon I reacted."—Kulpe, 2/III.
lated the purpose of eye-glasses as: 'The
correction of an error of refraction.'"—
Lehner, 5/III.
(2) The concept of purpose sometimes (2) This was not noted in the description
involves the consciousness of the relation of of the kinasthetic imagery.
the object to other things.
Gabel: "Immediately after the appear-
ance of the word an auditory-kinsesthetic
image thereof. Then came the know-
of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Professor Ogden stated that
he had reported some years ago at one of the meetings a series of experiments similar
to the present in all details. He never published his results, but they were identical
with my own. In the interests of a better insight into individual differences it is to be
hoped that Professor Ogden will some day give us the advantage of his unpublished
results.
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ledge that the fork is an instrument for
eating, accompanied by a weak visual
image of a fork. I was also conscious that
'fork' stands in relation to 'knife.'"—
Kiilpe, 2/III.
(3) The concept of purpose though often
restricted to one 0} various possible ends has
always a certain generality.
Kette: " I pictured to myself a toler-
ably strong chain and remembered from
the day6 of my youth that such chains
were used to tie animals in their stalls. I
saw the whole situation of that day rise
up before me."—Lehner, 5/III.
(4) The consciousness of purpose seldom
stops with a means but rests in a concept
conceived of as the object's end.
Uhr: "Immediately after the appear-
ance of the word I had an auditory-kinaes-
thetic image, then the thought: 'The
clock must be wound up!' and then the
further thought: 'The clock tells the
time!' Then I reacted. Weak visual
image of a clock on a wall."—Kulpe,
2/III.
(5) The concept of purpose, even though
delayed, comes as a natural development of
thought about the object.
(3) The hinasthetic image is often per-
fectly definite and limited to an individual
act in a certain time and place.
Pickel: "I imaged a pick-ax, such as is
used for working hard ground and saw
myself in my garden in the act of lifting it
in the air. The consciousness of the
purpose of a pick-ax is a psychological
process which cannot be identified with
the act of lifting it."—Lehner, 2/V.
Wiege: "The meaning aroused the
image of a cradle. I go back in thought
to my childhood and feel how I rock my
brother. The kinsesthetic image in this
case contains a great part of the purpose."
—Gruninger, 4/III.
(4) The kintesthetic image regularly
concerns an art which is a means to the
object's end.
Lampe: " I imaged the lamp that I use
in my dwelling, and saw clearly that it
did not burn brightly enough, and then
imaged the turning up of the wick. The
kinsesthetic image of the movement
cannot be identified with the conscious-
ness of purpose."—Lehner, 2/III.
Trichter: "Immediately after the
simple meaning of the word, I had the
visual image of a funnel and then the
kinaesthetic image of laying hold of it
with my right hand and placing it over
an opening. Here also the kinassthetic
image falls short of being the fulfilment of
the purpose. For I think that the funnel
is the instrument by means of which I
pour fluid through an opening, and my
image is only the placing of the funnel
in the opening."—Gruninger, 4/III.
(5) The kinasthetic image is often
forced and is superfluous to the under-
standing of the function of the object.
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Handbeil: "I soon understood the
word, but the simple consciousness of
meaning was forced into the background
of consciousness by the task. I can ex-
press this simple consciousness of mean-
ing by the sentence:' I know well what
that is!' Then I asked myself under the
influence of my task: 'What purpose does
it serve?' Then there came to me the
clear concept that it is of use in cutting
wood. With this concept of purpose
were some broken, confused words. I do
not know whether they were German or
English. There was also a dark blurred
image of an island in Lake George, where
I have often cut wood in summer."—
Moore, 16/VL
(6) The concept of purpose, though at
times more or less restricted, never mis-
carries entirely.
Fahne: It was rather difficult for me
to connect a kinxsthetic image with the
word. At first I imaged a flag as I saw
one recently waving on a little tower in
Leopold Street. But I said to myself at
once, 'This waving is not a kinzsthetic
image.' Then I imaged to myself how I
would place this flag on the little tower.
That the purpose of the flag is not cov-
ered by my motor image of it, goes
without saying."—Lehner, 5/IIL
(6) The kinasthetic image is not always
pertinent to the purpose of the object.
Bohrer: "Again the meaning first and
then a visual image of the object—of a
whole situation. I attempted to screw
a drill through the wall, and instead of
that I lifted the whole wall with the
drill."—Frl. Marezoll, 9/VII.
V. MEANING AND THE WORD
(a) Quantitative Results
In the perception of the meaning of words, subjects often
spoke of the meaning being associated with an auditory-
kinassthetic verbal image of the word itself. No attempt was
made to find out by reaction time the temporal relations of
the verbal image and meaning in the perception of printed
words. From the introspective results no definite answer
can be obtained. The two are so close together that they
appear simultaneous. One might, however, surmise that
since the word must be read, in order that it may be perceived
and understood, verbal sensations or verbal imagery are
likely to come prior to understanding.
On account of the close connection with the sensations
involved in reading and the understanding of printed words,
such material presents no little difficulty in studying the
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necessary relations between verbal imagery and meaning.
Pictures seemed to offer a more favorable material for study.
If meaning is the kinaesthesis of speech, then the knowledge
that a picture before me represents a tree should come when
I name the picture and not before. A series of reaction
times for the naming of pictures and perceiving the meaning
of pictures should give approximately identical results.
Three of our subjects took part in these experiments.
With all three subjects there is strong evidence that in
general it takes longer to react to the word than to the
meaning. The means for reaction to the word are, in every
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Number of times median for meaning exceeds reaction time for word=o.
greater than the mean variation. With one subject in 29
reactions to words, only 6 were shorter than the median
for meaning; with another, 1 in 14; with another, o in 12.
(b) Introspective Data
Turning to the introspective results we find them in
accordance with the quantitative measurements. Time and
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time again, whether the task were meaning or word, the
same sequence of events was perceived, viz., (i) meaning,
(2) word, (3) reaction. Often, however, when the task was
meaning, the word was reported as coming during or after
reaction.
Some special points of difference between the word and
the meaning are given below.
(1) The meaning leads to the word—the
designation of the picture.
Frosch: "The meaning was first present.
I felt a strong striving for the word, as it
were from various sides of the drawing.
The reaction followed after the entrance of
the word."—Lehner, 9/V.
(2) A meaning cannot be lacking if the
subject names the picture—no matter what
the task.
(3) The meaning is what it is by its own
right. It is never said to have a meaning.
Pferd: "Immediately after I saw the
picture I experienced a tone of familiarity
and knew what this picture represented.
At the same time, with the reaction came
the word 'Pferd.' I did not react to
the word. The tone of familiarity was
related not to the picture, but to what it
signified. The picture was a symbol of
real objects and its signification con-
sisted herein, viz.—to point to them."—
Kulpe, 9/III.
(4) The meaning is sometimes desig-
nated by a word which is known to be in-
appropriate.
Lilie: "First I recognized in the picture
a flower, then I named it by mistake
'Tulpe.' I knew that 'Tulpe' did not fit
the picture. Then through the form of
the flower, etc., I was occasioned to say
"Glockenblume."—Lehner, 9/III.
(1) The word never leads to the meaning.
(2) The word may be lacking when the
task is meaning.
Eimer: The word did not appear at all.
Various memories were in the back-
ground of consciousness.—Frl. Marezoll,
26/V.
(3) The word may have a special mean-
ing of its own; e. g., the word has a more
general meaning than that of the picture.
Engel:" Immediately a memory image.
After this image came the word. I knew
that the meaning of the word was more
general than that of the picture."—Frl.
Marezoll, 25/VI.
(4) The word is never designated by a
meaning.
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VI. INFLUENCE OF THE OBSERVER'S ATTITUDE
When a short abstract of this paper was read last Decem-
ber at the meeting of the Southern Society of Philosophy and
Psychology, it was suggested that the difference in reaction
time to meaning and imagery is to be explained by a difference
in the attitude of the subject. He reacts quicker when told
to react to meaning, not because the meaning is something
different from the imagery but because he himself assumes
a different attitude.
This objection implies that there is no real difference
between meaning and imagery, but that when we call them
by different names the subject, for some obscure reason,
assumes such a different attitude that it markedly influences
his reaction time. The objector in other words does not
wish to admit a difference between meaning and imagery, and
refers the difference in reaction time to an unexplained and
perhaps inexplicable mystery.
To say the least, this explanation is highly improbable.
For supposing there is no such thing as a special 'meaning
process' and that the accruing image is identical with the
meaning, then the task of the subject in the two sets of
reactions is really identical. It is simply called by different
names. If that were the case, then the subject ought (i) to
have a real difficulty in distinguishing his two tasks. (2) He
ought to give introspective reports identifying the two pro-
cedures. (3) The reaction times ought to be identical within
the limits of the probable error.
None of these things were so, but on the contrary (1) The
tasks were readily distinguished. (2) The introspective re-
ports clearly separate the two processes. (3) The reaction
times are markedly different.
All this tends to render highly improbable, if not impos-
sible, the explanation which suggested that the difference in
the reaction times is not to be explained by a real difference
in the tasks, dependent on a difference between meaning and
imagery, but is due entirely to the difference in the attitude
of the subject. In fact, it is very hard even to imagine a
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mental mechanism which would produce two separate atti-
tudes with such different effects in the reaction-times, if
that to which the subject takes an attitude is in both cases
merely one and the same thing that the experimenter calls
by a different name.
Let us, however, go a step further. Our subjects reacted
to visual and kinaesthetic images. If we wish to compare the
reaction times in this case we will find them markedly dif-
ferent. Is it possible to explain that difference by a difference
in the attitude of the subject?
If we should argue visual imagery is distinct from kin-
aesthetic (1) because the subject distinguishes two different
tasks when told to react to the one or the other; (2) because
the introspective reports clearly separate the one from the
other; (3) because the reaction times to visual imagery are
much shorter than to kinaesthetic imagery, no one would
doubt the validity of the argument. When, however, the
same argument is made in regard to imagery and meaning, it
is called in question and the attempt is made to explain away
the difference by ascribing it to a difference in the attitude of
the subject. If, however, the difference in the attitude of the
subject is not the real explanation in the latter case, but a
real difference between visual and kinaesthetic imagery, then
this difference in the attitude of the subject cannot, without
any more ado, explain the shorter reaction time for meaning
as compared with imagery.
Furthermore, the difference in attitude itself must be
explained. Granted that there is a difference in attitude,
what is the most likely explanation for the fact? The first
thing that comes to mind is that in the two sets of conditions
the subject is taking an attitude to two different things. If
that is the case then, meaning and imagery must be dis-
tinguished. But how distinguished—as two different mental
processes or as two aspects of one and the same process?
In the sequence of events that follow the exposition of the
stimulus word, there may be, if you wait long enough, not
only visual but also kinassthetic imagery. Are these aspects
of one and the same mental processes, or specifically dif-
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ferent items in a definite series of events? Reasons have
already been given for distinguishing them. These reasons
point to events that are qualitatively distinct, and the
distinction can scarcely be called in question. But the very
same reasons point to meaning as qualitatively distinct from
imagery. When, furthermore, one considers the fact that in
the understanding of words the meaning process is never
absent, but that visual and kinaesthetic imagery may both
be lacking, there is an added reason why meaning should not
be identified with an aspect of visual or kinaesthetic imagery.
Furthermore, a difference in the attitude of the observer
cannot be made the sole reason for the difference in the re-
action times.
(i) In the set of experiments referred to in the beginning,
the subject's task was to observe and remember a series of
words, pictures or objects. Nothing was said about attending
to meaning or imagery. He had simply to report what he
had experienced—whatever that might be. Here the ques-
tion of a difference in the "set" of the observer does not enter
at all. In these experiments, the subjects reported that in
the perception of words, meaning preceded imagery. This
suggested the problem of an objective test of the accuracy of
the introspection. The reaction time experiments followed,
and confirmed with entire satisfaction the introspections of
the earlier series.
(ii) In the reaction time experiments no matter what the
task—whether the subject is in the meaning attitude or the
image attitude, he regularly reports meaning as coming
prior to imagery. If the difference in the 'set' of the observer
were the sole reason for the difference in reaction time, we
should not expect that no matter what his 'set' he would
nevertheless observe a rather constant temporal relation
between meaning and imagery.
The introspective results and the reaction times are supple-
mentary. When taken together they leave no doubt that
we have really been investigating the temporal relation of
meaning and imagery.
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VII. T H E CONTEXT THEORY OF MEANING AND THE T E M -
PORAL RELATIONS OF MEANING AND IMAGERY
I t may now be asked: Whom does all this concern?
Who maintains that imagery is meaning? In spite of a
certain modification of the image theory of meaning, Pro-
fessor Titchener's context theory cannot account for the
experimental facts brought out in his own and other labora-
tories. From an analysis of his theory it is apparent that he
maintains that meaning is often identical with imagery. In
fact under the conditions of our experiments the images and
words that followed upon the sensations of the stimulus words
and pictures were actually the context. Analogous conscious
states have been reported by Cornell observers as the meaning
under somewhat similar conditions. But they did not take
into consideration the temporal relations of meaning and
imagery.
A brief analysis of the context theory of meaning will show
how intimately it is concerned with the temporal relations
of meaning and imagery.
(a) Outline of the Theory
"Meaning, psychologically, is always context."1 Such is
the definition that Professor Titchener gives to a fact of
consciousness with which the modern psychology of thought
is now interested.
What is context? Context in English is a word used to
signify the setting of a sentence or a quotation—its relation
to what the author has written before and after the passage in
question. Titchener lays particular stress upon what comes
after in the definition of psychological context. "Context,
in this sense, is simply the mental process which accrues to
the given process through the situation in which the organism
finds itself." A sensation by itself has no meaning—neither
has an image. When a second mental process accrues to a
former one—this second mental process is the meaning of the
first one. It does not produce a new something called mean-
1
' A Text Book of Psychology,' New York, 1911, p. 367.
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ing, it is the meaning. "One mental process is the meaning
of another mental process if it is in that other's context."2
What are the mental processes that accrue to others
and thus constitute their meaning? Originally the secondary
process which constituted the meaning was a group of sensa-
tions coming from a bodily attitude of the organism. If
the animal took an attitude of defence the kinaesthetic sensa-
tions thus aroused did not exactly mean—did not signify that
something to be feared was at hand. The whole complex of
sensations involved constituted the meaning "something to
be feared."
At the present day, however, the human mind has passed
beyond the elementary stage of the primitive organism. The
essential difference between present human intelligence and
its early prototype consists in the use of imagery as well as
sensations for the constituents of meaning. "Image has
now intervened upon sensation and meaning can be carried
in imaginal terms."2 Thus spoken and written language has
become possible. A sensation arouses an image and the
image—the psychological process accruing to the sensations—
is the meaning of the sensation.
Various types of mind exist. Each has a special tendency
to form some kind of imagery in understanding sensations.
Indeed "If we were to make serious work of a differential
psychology of meaning, we should probably find that in the
multitudinous variety of situations and contexts, any mental
process may possibly be the meaning of any other."3
It is Professor Titchener's opinion however that of all
the possible types of supplementary mental processes, two
are of special importance: kinassthesis and verbal images.
Indeed he pushes the verbal theory so far as to say: "The
words that we read are both perception and context of per-
ception, the auditory kinsesthetic idea is the meaning of the
visual symbols."4
» Op. ciu, p. 367.
* Op. cit., p. 367.
s
 'Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes,' 1909, p.
178.
«'A Text-Book of Psychology,' p. 368.
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Thus far, Professor Titchener's theory is entirely psycho-
logical. But in order to meet all possible contingencies
arising from introspections that he or others may report,
where meaning shows no trace of a sensory conscious element
—a physiological factor is introduced.
Meaning is not always conscious; i. e.t the imaginal
supplement to the sensation is not always to be found even
by the most careful introspection. In such cases the sensory
supplement exists—it is a physiological process in the nervous
system.
Professor Titchener thus summarizes his theory of per-
ception :
"Our account of the psychology of perception is now, in
the author's view, complete. It has embraced four principal
points:
"First, under the general laws of attention and the special
laws of sensory connection, sensations are welded together,
consolidated, incorporated into a group.
"Secondly, this group of sensations is supplemented by
images.
"Thirdly, the supplemental group has a fringe, a back-
ground, a context; and this context is the psychological
equivalent of its logical meaning.
"Fourthly, meaning may lapse from consciousness and
conscious context may be replaced by a non-conscious nerv-
ous set."1
The type of meaning in the third caption is decidedly
different from that given a few pages previous. There
meaning is context—context is the mental process that
follows upon and accrues to another mental process. The
examples given are the images spoken of in the second caption.
Here we suddenly find that meaning does not lie in the adven-
ing images—but in their fringes.
To harmonize this new idea with what has gone before
we may suppose that if meaning is conscious (in the sense of
being conscious described by Titchener) it is given by the
context which may be (a) a second group of sensations, (b)
1
 ' A Text Book of Psychology,' 1911, p. 371.
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an image or a group of images, (c) the fringe or background of
such images—the fringe itself being always understood as
some kind of sensory element or elements, (d) various com-
binations of (a), (b) and (c).
(b) The Evidence for the Theory
In the interests of simplicity we may leave aside the
speculations about meaning in the primitive organism and
confine ourselves to the explanation of the fact of meaning
as we experience it.
On what then, may we ask, is the statement based that
meaning is context—that it is a ' sensory complex B, following
upon sensation or image A.' The points of evidence are:
1. Introspection shows that when a word or a sentence is
understood and careful search is made we always find some
kind of imagery—verbal, kinaesthetic, visual, etc.
Granted that this is so what does it prove? Nothing more
than this. In the complex of mental processes called up by
the task of understanding a word or sentence imagery is
present. It does not show that this imagery is the meaning
—which is the very point in question.
Titchener says: "The meaning of the printed page may
now consist in the auditory-kinaesthetic accompaniment of
internal speech; the word is the word's own meaning."1
He then refers in a note to introspections in the studies
of Watt and of Messer which speaks of meaning being simul-
taneous with auditory-kinaesthetic imagery. But such a
citation is not to the point. The fact that one thing accom-
panies another is certainly no evidence that the two are
identical.
2. Analysis shows no evidence of 'imageless thoughts.'
What analysis shows is the fact of meaning. Many
observers have maintained that in their consciousness of
meaning sensational elements are lacking. Professor Titch-
ener in his analysis finds also the fact of meaning and giving
to the students in his laboratory the task of reporting every
mental process that they can observe, he obtains experiences
1
 'Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought Process,' p. 177.
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far richer in sensational elements than are elsewhere found.
Given the task, 'find imagery,' and it will certainly come.
And if the subject be told to look for imageless imagery, it
will not be found. Meaning and imagery however, have
been found both by Professor Titchener and a number of
other observers. Facts are common property. It remains
for Professor Titchener to prove that meaning is identical
with the concomitant or subsequent imagery. This he has
not done.
The context theory of imagery demands imagery, when
meaning is present. If meaning equals imagery, imagery
equals imagery. No imagery—no meaning, must be the
'conclusion to be drawn from this theory. Nevertheless
Professor Titchener shrinks from admitting all that is involved
in his doctrine. Why? Because he himself has observed
that there are times when he experiences meaning and is not
conscious of imagery. He himself, therefore, in spite of the
ease with which he images things and situations, has experi-
enced the very state of mind the existence of which he denies.
" In rapid reading, the skimming of pages in quick succes-
sion; in the rendering of a musical composition, without
hesitation or reflection, in a particular key; in shifting from
one language to another as you turn to your right or left-
hand neighbor at a dinner table: in these and similar cases,
meaning has time and time again, no discoverable representa-
tion in consciousness."1 No discoverable representation in
consciousness means no sensational element—no sensational
or imaginal complex.
What is Professor Titchener's explanation of such "image-
less thoughts" that come to him as he skims over the pages
of a book? He has found "imageless thoughts," what then
is to be done with them ? Explain them away and then deny
their existence. How explain them away? Refer them to
the nervous system? Meaning here is not imagery for no
imagery is present. What is it then ? A physiological proc-
ess, without any conscious accompaniment. Why without
any conscious accompaniment? Because by hypothesis the
1
 'A Text-Book of Psychology,' p. 369.
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only conscious processes that come into consideration are
sensations and these are lacking.
On the one hand, we have an hypothesis; on the other,
a fact—the imageless consciousness of meaning (imageless
thoughts) in rapid reading. The fact cannot be accounted
for by the hypothesis; therefore Professor Titchener denies
the fact. My consciousness of meaning is unconscious. I do
not think but my nervous system is thinking for me.
The reference of imageless thought to an unconscious
physiological process in the nervous system brings us to a
third point in the evidence for Professor Titchener's theory.
(3) " Our psychology is to be explanatory and our explana-
tions are to be physiological."1
Adherence to this principle and the .ruling out of facts
that it cannot explain, give to Professor Titchener's theory a
certain plausibility.
What can be referred to the nervous system is explained
What cannot be referred to the nervous system is not ex-
plained. It is in fact inexplicable. There must be a mistake
in the observation. It must be explained away. The ner-
vous system with its sense organs and its centres, can appar-
ently take care of sensations and images. It gives us the
sensational elements of our conscious life and apparently
excludes anything like imageless thinking. If then we are
to explain 'imageless thought' we must analyze it in terms
of the elements given by the nervous system, or else explain
it away altogether.
Such a procedure, however, places empirical psychology
not only under the dominion of metaphysics, but subjects it
to one particular metaphysical theory. Under such condi-
tions an impartial empirical study of the mind becomes
impossible. Let us first study the facts of consciousness and
then build up our metaphysical theories.
Professor Titchener is right in demanding that the science
of psychology should be explanatory; he is wrong in main-
taining that everything must be explained in consonance
with a particular metaphysical theory.
1
 'A Text-Book of Psychology,' p. 370.
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As a matter of fact neither Professor Titchener nor anyone
else knows the limitations nor the possibilities of the nervous
system. Nor does anyone know, for that matter, what the
nervous system may be called upon to do if it is to explain
the facts of our conscious life. We do not know all about the
facts of consciousness and until we do, explanatory psychology
must be careful. We do not know all about the nervous
system and it is not wise to distort the fact of consciousness
to fit the narrow outlines of our present horizon.
Let us first investigate the facts of consciousness without
any timidity about their ultimate explanation. Let us first
find out what we have to explain, and then explain it.
The context theory of meaning is not based entirely upon
such general considerations as we have picked out from
Professor Titchener's writings. There are a number of
experimental studies that have been put forward as tests in
confirmation of the theory.
Of these, we may analyze two, leaving a more complete
account of the literature to a full report of our experiments
which we hope to publish later.
Helen Clarke,1 in an article on 'Conscious Attitudes' took
up the problem of the understanding of words and sentences.
She confirmed the reports of other observers that 'often the
images are adequate, irrelevant or even contradictory' (p. 241).
The inadequacy she explained by saying that 'we have no
criterion save the facts themselves, by which we can decide
how clear or complete an image must be in order to carry a
meaning' (p. 241). The contradictory character she ac-
counted for by pointing out that in every one of her cases
there was 'sufficient connection between the logical meaning
of the word, and the psychological context of the act of
understanding, for the latter to carry a general meaning'
(p. 242). The fact of irrelevancy, she said, was less easy
to explain.
Miss Clarke therefore seems to be conscious of the fact
that words have a logical meaning which cannot be identified
with the imagery that they evolve. She distinguishes be-
1
 Am. ]. ofPsychoi, XXII., pp. 214-249.
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tween the word—the imagery that it evolves—and the
meaning that is carried. She finds also that imagery is often
irrelevant. Irrelevant to what, we may ask? To the mean-
ing. She therefore realizes a difference between the psycho-
logical process called an image and another something of
which she is also conscious and which may be termed the
meaning of the word. Miss Clarke1 seems to look upon
general meaning as a logical something of which no account
need be taken in psychology. If, however, the task of psychol-
ogy is to investigate all conscious processes, logical meaning
cannot be ruled out as 'outside the sphere of psychology.'2
For "logical meaning" is conscious. Its nature is therefore
a psychological problem. It is that something to which the
imagery is often inadequate, irrelevant and contradictory.
Miss Clarke has implicitly at least recognized it as a conscious
state, distinct from imagery.
Edmund Jacobson3 investigated by the Method of Intro-
spection (i) The Perception of Letters, (2) The Meaning of
Words, (3) The Understanding of Sentences. The instructions
to his subjects (three observers) were as follows:
I. Give a minute account of all the mental processes you
experience in their temporal order of sequence.
II. Put direct description of conscious processes outside
of parentheses, and statements concerning meanings, objects,
stimuli and physiological occurrences inside.
The experiments on the perception of letters showed that
under the instructions given their meaning is usually accom-
panied by the arousal of what Jacobson termed designatory
processes, viz., kinaesthetic or auditory sensations or both.
Jacobson calls attention to the fact that "The main point
to note is that the precise statement of meaning is by no
means easy." Nor does he state anything more definite as
to what the meaning of a letter is.
The experiments with the meaning of the words were made
as follows: "A written word was laid before the observer for
a period of one minute. He was instructed to fixate the
1
 Along with Geissler, Am. J. of Psychol., XXIII., p. 194,
J
 Cf. Geissler, /. c.
* Am. J. of Psychol., 1911, XXII., pp. 553-577-
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word, to utter it with quick repetition and to get at its mean-
ing. The concluding ten seconds were marked off by signals;
and the observer's task was to report what occurred in con-
sciousness during the particular interval." The observer re-
ported two kinds of imagery: (a) That which appeared as the
carrier of the meaning and (b) that which appeared as irrele-
vant. No logical or psychological test could be found to
distinguish between the relevant and irrelevant imagery.
The conclusion of Jacobson was "that the conscious
meanings brought out in these experiments are not perfect
and static logical meanings of definition. . . . Logically, the
representation of meaning is inadequate; psychologically, it
is adequate to the demands of the occasion" (pp. 568-569).
In his experiments on the meaning of sentences, Jacobson
found cases in which (1) an automatic reading was followed
by a perception of the meaning identified with images called
forth by the experiment. (2) Cases in which the mean-
ing did not come to the subject at all in spite of a wealth
of visual, organic, kinaesthetic and tactual sensations. (3)
Cases in which the visual and auditory images and sensations
from reading were the sole processes present in consciousness
—and yet the sentence had meaning. Jacobson concludes:
(1) "Wherever there is meaning there are also processes,"
i. e., sensations and images of one kind or another. (2) "The
correlated meanings and processes are two renderings from
different points of view of the same experience."
The first conclusion seems established by the introspective
reports, but it holds only for the conditions of these experi-
ments where ample time is given for images to appear and
the task is set to report primarily mental processes, i. e.,
sensations and images; and secondarily, in parentheses, to
note meaning as it arises..
The second conclusion: (which is really the "crux" of the
whole situation) meaning is an aspect of sensation and imagery,
is simply stated and the reader is left to judge for himself
on what evidence the conclusion is based. The only evidence
in his paper for such an indentification is to be sought in the
fact that his subjects, as a rule, were not satisfied that they
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had anything that corresponded with their idea of meaning
till relevant imagery was present. This simply shows that
meaning in the Cornell sense is not present till such imagery
arises. From Jacobson's own data, it appears, however,
that meaning in a broader sense must have been present
when meaning in the Cornell sense was denied. When Dr.
Geissler, instructor in psychology at Cornell, for 3 seconds,
looked at the sentence, "Did you see him kill the man?,"
and then declared at the end "No meaning all the way
through," we can only conclude that "meaning" must have
been taken in a very restricted sense. When again he looked
at the sentence, "The iron cube fell heavily on the floor,"
reads it as so many meaningless words, and then on rereading
obtains the meaning, a very loud sound, the time of the
whole procedure being 4.5 seconds, the conclusion is strength-
ened that during the experiment, he was seeking for a meaning
in the sense of an imaginal representation. In this sense, and
in no other, is Jacobson's conclusion warranted. An imaginal
representation is some kind of imagery. The sweeping con-
clusion that meaning is an aspect of imagery requires the
proof of another proposition, namely that all meaning
consists in imaginal representation.
The data of this piece of introspective work is incom-
patible neither with the data nor the conclusions of the
Kvilpean school. Indeed it has confirmed the fact that the
meaning of a sentence may be present when the sole proc-
esses present in consciousness are the visual and auditory
images and sensations from reading. And if it be true that
on certain occasions, as in Geissler's case, these same processes
were present and the meaning was really absent, one should
conclude that they cannot be identical with the meaning.
In like manner, a physician refuses to admit that a definite"
microorganism is the cause of a disease—if at times it is
found when the disease does not occur, and the disease
occurs when the organism is absent. Jacobson should there-
fore have admitted that there are times at least when meaning
is not a mere aspect of sensations and images.
Professor Titchener looks upon the chief value of Jacob-
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son's work in making the distinctions between the mere
statement that meaning is present and the analytic descrip-
tion of the psychological part of meaning. He says that
"He finds no specific 'meaning process' underlying the
statement of meaning."1
True it is that Jacobson found no special sensory or
imaginal process as the habitual carrier of meanings, but he
did not prove that meaning is not itself a conscious process.
In fact, his experiments seem rather to confirm the conclusion
that meaning is not imagery, but something else altogether.
Had the Cornell School taken cognizance of the temporal
relations of meaning and imagery, the context theory of
meaning would have been profoundly modified. Imaginal
terms may accrue to incoming sensations and constitute by
definition their context. Do they constitute their meaning?
A determination of the temporal relation that imagery bears
to meaning shows that this is impossible. What comes after
another cannot be said to cause, or constitute.it, or be identical
with it. Meaning, therefore, is not context. What is it—
a mere negation? Not at all. It is a definite mental process
sui generis. What are its qualitative characters? Some of
these have been already indicated. A further development
of the concept will be given with the fuller account of these
investigations.
1
" Description w. Statement of Meaning," Am. J. of Psycho!., 1912, XXIII., p. 182.
